1/*
2 * Copyright (c) 2007-2010 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
5 *
6 * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
7 * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
8 * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
9 * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
10 * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
11 * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
12 * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
13 * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
14 *
15 * Please obtain a copy of the License at
16 * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
17 *
18 * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
19 * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
20 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
21 * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
22 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
23 * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
24 * limitations under the License.
25 *
26 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
27 */
28
29/*-
30 * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
31 * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
32 * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
33 *
34 * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
35 * TrustedBSD Project.
36 *
37 * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
38 * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
39 * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
40 * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
41 *
42 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
43 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
44 * are met:
45 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
46 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
47 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
48 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
49 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
50 *
51 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
52 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
53 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
54 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
55 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
56 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
57 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
58 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
59 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
60 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
61 * SUCH DAMAGE.
62 *
63 */
64
65#include <string.h>
66#include <sys/param.h>
67#include <sys/ucred.h>
68#include <sys/malloc.h>
69#include <sys/sbuf.h>
70#include <sys/vnode.h>
71#include <sys/proc.h>
72#include <sys/proc_internal.h>
73#include <sys/kauth.h>
74#include <sys/imgact.h>
75#include <mach/mach_types.h>
76#include <kern/task.h>
77
78#include <security/mac_internal.h>
79#include <security/mac_mach_internal.h>
80
81#include <bsd/security/audit/audit.h>
82
83struct label *
84mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
85{
86 struct label *label;
87
88 label = mac_labelzone_alloc(MAC_WAITOK);
89 if (label == NULL)
90 return (NULL);
91 MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_init, label);
92 return (label);
93}
94
95void
96mac_cred_label_init(struct ucred *cred)
97{
98 cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
99}
100
101void
102mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
103{
104 MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_destroy, label);
105 mac_labelzone_free(label);
106}
107
108int
109mac_cred_label_compare(struct label *a, struct label *b)
110{
111 return (bcmp(a, b, sizeof (*a)) == 0);
112}
113
114int
115mac_cred_label_externalize_audit(struct proc *p, struct mac *mac)
116{
117 kauth_cred_t cr;
118 int error;
119
120 cr = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
121
122 error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE_AUDIT(cred, cr->cr_label,
123 mac->m_string, mac->m_buflen);
124
125 kauth_cred_unref(&cr);
126 return (error);
127}
128
129void
130mac_cred_label_destroy(kauth_cred_t cred)
131{
132
133 mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
134 cred->cr_label = NULL;
135}
136
137int
138mac_cred_label_externalize(struct label *label, char *elements,
139 char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags __unused)
140{
141 int error = 0;
142
143 error = MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
144
145 return (error);
146}
147
148int
149mac_cred_label_internalize(struct label *label, char *string)
150{
151 int error;
152
153 error = MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
154
155 return (error);
156}
157
158/*
159 * By default, fork just adds a reference to the parent
160 * credential. Policies may need to know about this reference
161 * if they are tracking exit calls to know when to free the
162 * label.
163 */
164void
165mac_cred_label_associate_fork(kauth_cred_t cred, proc_t proc)
166{
167 MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_fork, cred, proc);
168}
169
170/*
171 * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other
172 * kernel processes and threads are spawned.
173 */
174void
175mac_cred_label_associate_kernel(kauth_cred_t cred)
176{
177
178 MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_kernel, cred);
179}
180
181/*
182 * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
183 * userland processes and threads are spawned.
184 */
185void
186mac_cred_label_associate_user(kauth_cred_t cred)
187{
188
189 MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate_user, cred);
190}
191
192/*
193 * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
194 * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible
195 * deltas. This function allows that processing to take place.
196 */
197void
198mac_cred_label_associate(struct ucred *parent_cred, struct ucred *child_cred)
199{
200
201 MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_associate, parent_cred, child_cred);
202}
203
204int
205mac_execve_enter(user_addr_t mac_p, struct image_params *imgp)
206{
207 struct user_mac mac;
208 struct label *execlabel;
209 char *buffer;
210 int error;
211 size_t ulen;
212
213 if (mac_p == USER_ADDR_NULL)
214 return (0);
215
216 if (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(current_proc())) {
217 struct user64_mac mac64;
218 error = copyin(mac_p, &mac64, sizeof(mac64));
219 mac.m_buflen = mac64.m_buflen;
220 mac.m_string = mac64.m_string;
221 } else {
222 struct user32_mac mac32;
223 error = copyin(mac_p, &mac32, sizeof(mac32));
224 mac.m_buflen = mac32.m_buflen;
225 mac.m_string = mac32.m_string;
226 }
227 if (error)
228 return (error);
229
230 error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
231 if (error)
232 return (error);
233
234 execlabel = mac_cred_label_alloc();
235 MALLOC(buffer, char *, mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
236 error = copyinstr(CAST_USER_ADDR_T(mac.m_string), buffer, mac.m_buflen, &ulen);
237 if (error)
238 goto out;
239 AUDIT_ARG(mac_string, buffer);
240
241 error = mac_cred_label_internalize(execlabel, buffer);
242out:
243 if (error) {
244 mac_cred_label_free(execlabel);
245 execlabel = NULL;
246 }
247 imgp->ip_execlabelp = execlabel;
248 FREE(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
249 return (error);
250}
251
252/*
253 * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
254 * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
255 * buffer cache.
256 *
257 * XXX: CRF_MAC_ENFORCE should be in a kauth_cred_t field, rather
258 * XXX: than a posix_cred_t field.
259 */
260void
261mac_cred_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
262{
263 posix_cred_t pcred = posix_cred_get(cred);
264
265 /* force label to be part of "matching" for credential */
266 pcred->cr_flags |= CRF_MAC_ENFORCE;
267
268 /* inform the policies of the update */
269 MAC_PERFORM(cred_label_update, cred, newlabel);
270}
271
272int
273mac_cred_check_label_update(kauth_cred_t cred, struct label *newlabel)
274{
275 int error;
276
277#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
278 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
279 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
280 return 0;
281#endif
282
283 MAC_CHECK(cred_check_label_update, cred, newlabel);
284
285 return (error);
286}
287
288int
289mac_cred_check_visible(kauth_cred_t u1, kauth_cred_t u2)
290{
291 int error;
292
293#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
294 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
295 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
296 return 0;
297#endif
298
299 MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, u1, u2);
300
301 return (error);
302}
303
304int
305mac_proc_check_debug(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
306{
307 kauth_cred_t cred;
308 int error;
309
310#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
311 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
312 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
313 return 0;
314#endif
315 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
316 return 0;
317
318 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
319 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, cred, proc);
320 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
321
322 return (error);
323}
324
325int
326mac_proc_check_fork(proc_t curp)
327{
328 kauth_cred_t cred;
329 int error;
330
331#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
332 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
333 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
334 return 0;
335#endif
336 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
337 return 0;
338
339 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
340 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_fork, cred, curp);
341 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
342
343 return (error);
344}
345
346int
347mac_proc_check_get_task_name(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
348{
349 int error;
350
351 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task_name, cred, p);
352
353 return (error);
354}
355
356int
357mac_proc_check_get_task(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
358{
359 int error;
360
361 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_task, cred, p);
362
363 return (error);
364}
365
366int
367mac_proc_check_expose_task(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
368{
369 int error;
370
371 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_expose_task, cred, p);
372
373 return (error);
374}
375
376int
377mac_proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports(struct proc *p, struct vnode *cur_vp, off_t cur_offset, struct vnode *img_vp, off_t img_offset, struct vnode *scriptvp)
378{
379 int error;
380
381 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports, p, cur_vp, cur_offset, img_vp, img_offset, scriptvp);
382
383 return (error);
384}
385
386/*
387 * The type of maxprot in proc_check_map_anon must be equivalent to vm_prot_t
388 * (defined in <mach/vm_prot.h>). mac_policy.h does not include any header
389 * files, so cannot use the typedef itself.
390 */
391int
392mac_proc_check_map_anon(proc_t proc, user_addr_t u_addr,
393 user_size_t u_size, int prot, int flags, int *maxprot)
394{
395 kauth_cred_t cred;
396 int error;
397
398#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
399 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
400 if (!mac_vm_enforce)
401 return 0;
402#endif
403 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc))
404 return (0);
405
406 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
407 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_map_anon, proc, cred, u_addr, u_size, prot, flags, maxprot);
408 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
409
410 return (error);
411}
412
413int
414mac_proc_check_mprotect(proc_t proc,
415 user_addr_t addr, user_size_t size, int prot)
416{
417 kauth_cred_t cred;
418 int error;
419
420#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
421 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
422 if (!mac_vm_enforce)
423 return 0;
424#endif
425 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(proc))
426 return (0);
427
428 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(proc);
429 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_mprotect, cred, proc, addr, size, prot);
430 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
431
432 return (error);
433}
434
435int
436mac_proc_check_run_cs_invalid(proc_t proc)
437{
438 int error;
439
440#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
441 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
442 if (!mac_vm_enforce)
443 return 0;
444#endif
445
446 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_run_cs_invalid, proc);
447
448 return (error);
449}
450
451int
452mac_proc_check_sched(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
453{
454 kauth_cred_t cred;
455 int error;
456
457#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
458 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
459 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
460 return 0;
461#endif
462 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
463 return 0;
464
465 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
466 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, proc);
467 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
468
469 return (error);
470}
471
472int
473mac_proc_check_signal(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc, int signum)
474{
475 kauth_cred_t cred;
476 int error;
477
478#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
479 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
480 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
481 return 0;
482#endif
483 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
484 return 0;
485
486 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
487 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, proc, signum);
488 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
489
490 return (error);
491}
492
493int
494mac_proc_check_wait(proc_t curp, struct proc *proc)
495{
496 kauth_cred_t cred;
497 int error;
498
499#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
500 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
501 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
502 return 0;
503#endif
504 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
505 return 0;
506
507 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
508 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, proc);
509 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
510
511 return (error);
512}
513
514void
515mac_proc_notify_exit(struct proc *proc)
516{
517 MAC_PERFORM(proc_notify_exit, proc);
518}
519
520int
521mac_proc_check_suspend_resume(proc_t curp, int sr)
522{
523 kauth_cred_t cred;
524 int error;
525
526#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
527 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
528 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
529 return 0;
530#endif
531 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
532 return 0;
533
534 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
535 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_suspend_resume, cred, curp, sr);
536 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
537
538 return (error);
539}
540
541int
542mac_proc_check_ledger(proc_t curp, proc_t proc, int ledger_op)
543{
544 kauth_cred_t cred;
545 int error = 0;
546
547#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
548 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
549 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
550 return 0;
551#endif
552 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
553 return 0;
554
555 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
556 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_ledger, cred, proc, ledger_op);
557 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
558
559 return (error);
560}
561
562int
563mac_proc_check_proc_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, int callnum, int flavor)
564{
565 kauth_cred_t cred;
566 int error = 0;
567
568#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
569 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
570 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
571 return 0;
572#endif
573 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
574 return 0;
575
576 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
577 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_proc_info, cred, target, callnum, flavor);
578 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
579
580 return (error);
581}
582
583int
584mac_proc_check_get_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op)
585{
586 kauth_cred_t cred;
587 int error = 0;
588
589#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
590 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
591 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
592 return 0;
593#endif
594 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
595 return 0;
596
597 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
598 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_get_cs_info, cred, target, op);
599 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
600
601 return (error);
602}
603
604int
605mac_proc_check_set_cs_info(proc_t curp, proc_t target, unsigned int op)
606{
607 kauth_cred_t cred;
608 int error = 0;
609
610#if SECURITY_MAC_CHECK_ENFORCE
611 /* 21167099 - only check if we allow write */
612 if (!mac_proc_enforce)
613 return 0;
614#endif
615 if (!mac_proc_check_enforce(curp))
616 return 0;
617
618 cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(curp);
619 MAC_CHECK(proc_check_set_cs_info, cred, target, op);
620 kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
621
622 return (error);
623}
624
625